A way of life that doubled as training
The strength of Mongol armies started in everyday life. Steppe herders learned to ride as children, lived with animals, and hunted on horseback. Skill with the bow and in the saddle was not a specialist craft but a common one. A pastoral society could therefore field a very large share of its adult men, and those men were already comfortable with long travel, hardship and handling horses. Compared with many European armies of the time, where trained mounted knights were a small elite, this gave the Mongols a deep pool of experienced riders.
Large organized hunts were also a form of rehearsal. Traditionally, the Mongols conducted big drives in which lines of riders encircled game over a wide area, an exercise in coordination and discipline that resembled battlefield maneuvers. Some accounts suggest hunts were used deliberately for military training, although we should be careful about how formal this was.
The composite bow
The main weapon was the composite bow, made from layers of wood, horn and sinew glued together. This construction allowed a short bow, suitable for use from horseback, to still have considerable power. Compared with a simple wooden bow of the same length, it stored more energy. Accurate range figures from the thirteenth century are uncertain, and sources that give exact distances should be treated with caution. What is clear is that the bow was effective enough to wear down enemy formations from a distance, and that riders carried multiple quivers and a range of arrowheads for different jobs, including armor-piercing and signaling types.
Riders also used lances, sabers, axes and maces, and shields were not always used. Heavier cavalry wearing lamellar or leather armor handled close combat, while light cavalry skirmished with bows. The balance depended on the period and the army.
Horses and mobility
Mongol horses were small and tough, and not especially fast. Their value lay in endurance and in the number available. A warrior typically had several mounts and could change from one to another during a campaign, so that none was worn out. Tradition says the horses could forage for themselves in winter by pawing through snow to find grass, which suited campaigns in harsh climates. Mares’ milk and dried foods supplemented rations, and in an emergency some accounts say riders drank the blood of their horses, although how common this was is uncertain.
The effect was mobility on a scale that baffled opponents. Armies could cover long distances in a day, split into multiple columns, and then reunite at a chosen place. This is how the Mongol invasions of Hungary and Poland were coordinated across a front of hundreds of miles, with forces arriving at their targets at around the same time.
Organization and command
The army was organized on a decimal system. Units of ten formed a hundred, a hundred formed a thousand, and a thousand formed a larger group commonly called a tumen, of nominally ten thousand. The numbers were more often a paper strength than an actual head count. Commanders were appointed by the ruler, and men could not leave their units. The system broke up older tribal loyalties, as covered in the story of how Genghis Khan rose to power.
Discipline was strict. Orders were passed with flags, horns, drums and messengers, and campaigns were planned well in advance, often with detailed intelligence gathered from merchants and scouts. Prominent generals, such as Subutai, were chosen for ability. Commanders generally led from positions behind the line, which allowed them to direct a battle rather than be caught up in it.
Tactics in the field
Mongol battlefield methods were flexible, and they relied on several repeated patterns:
- Harassment from a distance. Waves of horse archers shot into enemy ranks, withdrew and returned, wearing down troops and horses.
- The feigned retreat. A unit pretended to flee to draw an opponent out of position, then turned or was joined by other forces to attack the disordered pursuers. It was risky and needed excellent discipline, but accounts of its use are widespread, though not every retreat described as a trick was necessarily planned.
- Encirclement. Columns converged on an enemy from several directions, copying the logic of the hunt. They sometimes left a gap to encourage flight, because a fleeing army is easier to destroy than a cornered one.
- Psychological pressure. Reputation was a weapon. Cities that surrendered were often spared the worst, while those that resisted sometimes faced massacre, as contemporary writers described. Modern historians urge caution with the casualty numbers, but the policy of fear was real.
Sieges and borrowed skills
Cavalry alone could not take walled cities. The Mongols learned this in the campaigns in northern China and Central Asia, and they adapted. They recruited engineers and specialists from conquered peoples, particularly Chinese and Muslim experts, who built and operated trebuchets and catapults, early gunpowder devices and other siege machines. Besides direct assault, they used diversions, forced captives to work as laborers or screens, and diverted rivers. The siege of Baghdad in 1258 involved such methods on a large scale.
Limits and weaknesses
Mongol methods worked best on open ground where horses could maneuver and grass was plentiful. They were less effective in dense forest, marshland, mountains and tropical heat, and in places where fortified positions were strong. The failed amphibious attacks on Japan show the limits of a land-based military in naval warfare. Disease and climate could also cause major problems.
Their successes also owed much to circumstances beyond tactics: divided enemies, careful planning, and a strong central command. Those who faced them were not always poorly organized, and some, like the Mamluks, proved able to learn and counter the Mongol style. In that sense the horse archer was part of a wider system rather than an unbeatable weapon.